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The Brandi Report: Survival oí a Programme?
R e g in a ld  H e r b o ld  G re e n
W hat limits our response to this challenge . . . ? the  
non-existence o f  a clear and  generalised awareness 
o f  th e  realities an d  dangers and  the absence o f  
po litica l will to fa c e  up to them  and  take corrective  
action. Brandt Report (pp 267-8)
It is probably an accura te  observa tion  that in 
conditions o f  uncerta in ty there is a pre feren ce  to do  
noth ing  By default, i f  fo r  no o ther reason, it seem s  
probable . . . the Brandt R eport will en ter  the histoiy  
boo ks as iust ano ther w ell-in tentioned R eport that 
in practica l term s led  to nothing. G rah am  Bird'
T he purpo se  o f  the  Brandt R eport is to convey a 
m essage. . . it does so effectively and with conviction. 
The in ten tions. . . are adm irable. . . But the message 
as a whole is no t credible, because the  concep tion  
o f  th e  w orld on which it rests is false.
P. D. Henderson-'
There are severa l m u tua l eco no m ic  interests, (but) 
these are not su ffic ien tly  com pelling  to . . . m a ke  
W estern governments, including Britain s. give North- 
Sou th  relations a higher priority than they do. Tw o  
major elem en ts  are. how ever, m issing fro m  the  
eco no m ic  argum ent. One is som e aw areness o f  the  
political as well as econ om ic  im p ortance  o f  having  
an international order or 'rules o fth e  gam e". . . Second  
there  at e  m oral as well as eco no m ic  and  political 
considerations . . . I f  there is a case fo r  the  British 
G overn m en t to be m ore invo lved  in alleviating their  
p o ver ty  it is in th e  first instance a m oral one . . .
Vincent Cable '
This failure to understan d  the  enorm ous econom ic  
p o te n tia l o f  less w ealthy develop ing  countries both  
as m a rkets  and  as suppliers is c o m p o u n d ed  by tw o  
fu r th er  m isconceptions. The first is to  see existing  
internalicm al econ om ic  a n d  financial arrangem ents  
as essentially healthy and  adequate . . . The next 
m isconcep tion  is to p in the  blam e fo r  th e  world's 
econ om ic  malaise on O P E C . . . Edward H eath '
K icked into Obscurity?
In the  United Kingdom at least the question is no 
longer whether the Brandt Report's  proposals constitute 
an ad equa te  and appropria te  p rogram m e for survival: 
it is w h ether  they will survive as a serious focus for 
political debate and action. At the moment. Programme 
for S u ir iva l seems well on the way to joining its
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phenomenally ineffective and ill-timed predecessor 
Partners in D evelopm en t (Pearson Report) in the 
obscurity of academ ic stacks and footnotes.
Why has this happened? On the face of it the Brandt 
Report had several marks in its favour. It was a 
unanimous report of a n um ber  of statesmen and 
thinkers from major First and Third  World countries, 
which had both a clear message and a technically (and 
conceivably politically) practicable program me. T ha t  
programme was a blend of radical reformist capitalism 
(on the production side) and quasi-egalitarian social 
democracy (on the distribution and regulation side)—a 
blend that, on the face of it. has potential appeal to 
both major British parties. Further, the Report uses a 
‘mutual interest'  econom ic case for the rules of the 
game, and it argues for the reform of the international 
econom ic order  to augment (not supplant) the moral 
case for the eradication of absolute poverty.
Further, the Brandt Report is the only systematic 
program m e for global econom ic restructuring now o n  
the political market with any real chance of acceptance. 
T here  is no serious conservative northern  alternative. 
T h e  radical southern  alternatives may be coheren t  
and intellectually plausible, but on the one  hand they 
cannot be expected to be achieved without compromise 
and on the o the r  they tend to assume that the Old 
International Economic Order works well for industrial 
economies, ignoring the fact that it has been overtaken 
by the New International Economic Disorder/
One drawback is clear. While Program m e fo r  Survival 
does sec the econom ic order  as in growing disorder, its 
au thors did r.ot in 1977-79 envisage the degree of crisis 
in northern  econom ies  which has characterised  1980- 
81 and made northern  political leaders more inward- 
looking. They are  now even less willing to consider the 
Commissioner 's  claim that im provem ent in North- 
South relations is part of the ‘solution* and rigid 
resistance to restructuring itself part of the ‘problem ’. 
But that a lone seems inadequate  to explain the very 
limited practical response to Brandt even in the UK. 
Nor can one argue that the Brandt R ep o r t’s failure lies 
in intellectual weakness perse. Program m e f o r  S u i t  ¡val 
is a contribution to policy debate ,  not an academ ic  
model,  a sketch  map for how to devise program mes, 
not a blueprint. Such docum ents  rarely succeed  or  fail 
primarily on academ ic  merit,  and Brandt is by no 
means self evidently wrong, empirically or  theoretically.
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Indeed, as a policy docum ent and guide to action it 
rates rather  well.
Ideological R esistance
Yet it is in a related area  that we find the root of the 
hostility and inaction. It is ideological opposition that 
has constitu ted the most effective barrier to action 
even in the UK. (In the Third  World and in socialist 
Europe the basis for ideological objection is more 
obvious.)6
T he  support and opposition for the Brandt R eport—or 
international s tructural change more generally—do 
not however fit the simple division between capital 
and labour (or business and unions).7 Some businesses 
see profit in more trade and more aid. T hose  oriented 
to Third W'orld markets  and those dealing in Third 
World imports are examples.  Inversely, firms affected 
by imports favour trade restrictions and put the pressure 
on Third World sources in particular because they are 
seen as politically vulnerable ( though calls for restrictions 
against socialist Europe, Japan and the USA are 
growing too). In addition, firms whose profits depend 
on specialist knowledge of uncertain markets  and on 
frequent price ch anges—eg commodity  merchants  
and b ro k e rs  —have v es ted  in te res ts  in o pp os ing  
stabilisation, whatever merits it might have for producers 
and consumers or  in reducing the m acro  economic 
costs associated with rapid price and balance of payments 
changes.
Unions tend to take the same stance as their employers 
on these issues since they affect firms, workers and 
communities alike. While the running on restrictionism 
is m ade by firms, unions are just as concerned  about 
‘cheap  imports'; and genuine general co ncern  about 
solidarity or  broad mutual interest is effective in 
particular union decisions only if job security is not 
threa tened.
The force of uncertainty
By contrast,  uncertainty is a potent and unambiguous 
force against implementing even the Brandt Report 's  
initial p rogram me. As Bird" makes clear, there are two 
elements  to the m atter  the existence of an alternative 
explanation '1 of the present crisis which implies a 
different cure, and the fact that the effects of any 
major s tructural change are always uncertain  and 
cannot be foretold before it is implemented.
In a slightly different way H en derso n "1 raises a num ber  
of questions about  P rogram m e fo r  Survival's  implicit 
analysis, in particular w hether de m and  stimulation is 
appropria te  and w h ether  the international context is 
the dom inant cause of the Third  World 's  econom ic 
problems." While no alternative model for North- 
South relations emerges, the general effect, as intended.
is to  s tress  the  u n c e r ta in ty  o f  the  o u tc o m e  of 
implementing Brandt, to  cast doubt  as to w h ether  it 
would be a good thing.
W hen resources are limited and a series of crises 
confronts a Cabinet,  a firm, a party o r a  union, there  is 
a tendency to avoid taking major, resource-intensive 
decisions whose effects are  perceived as uncertain. 
This inertia can be overcom e —eg. the present UK 
G o v e r n m e n t ’s re f in e m e n t  and  in ten s i f ica t io n  of 
Chancellor Healey's main policies is extremely uncertain 
of outcom e. This, however, requires both a belief that 
a change of course is essential and intense commitment 
to specific changes in the 'na t ion a l  interest.
Few major politicians, businessmen or trade unionists 
see North-South relations (beyond OPEC) as crucial 
to overcoming Britain's econom ic crisis.1-’ (Mr Heath 
is an exception, as is Mrs Hart and perhaps M r Steel; 
on occasion Lord Carrington and Sir Ian Gilm our 
have appeared partially convinced.) They  view the 
present s ituation as marginally unsatisfactory and 
im provem ents  as postponeab le .  T h ere fo re ,  under  
conditions of uncertainty they are  not prepared  to 
devote substantial attention or  resources to attempting 
major ch anges—a tendency heavily reinforced by the 
working patterns of both private and public sector  
bureaucracies which, pari passu, op t  for the 'tried and 
true’, the relatively certain, the low risk rather  than 
the innovative.1'
Alternative explanations of and remedies 
for the crisis
If one  accepts  that too much money creation in 
relation to production is the main cause of curren t 
economic problems, and that the primary remedy is to 
squeeze m onetary expansion, then d em and  reflation 
is a counterproductive  prescription. Broadly speaking 
that is the dom inant position within the present British 
G overnm ent,  many middle class professionals and 
1 bureaucrats and fractions of the financial, commercial 
and industrial com m unities .14
A variant of this critique derives from the curren t IM F 
analysis1' which gives priority to the control of inflation, 
specifically to restoring the balance between supply 
and demand by cutting the latter I especially by reducing 
real wages), not raising the former. However, the IM F 
is co ncerned  about the cost-push effects of un d er­
capacity operation, and actually favours both recycling/ 
transfer of international liquidity and energy p r ice /  
production m anagem ent appro ach es  which are co m ­
patible with the Brandt proposals.  Nevertheless, in its 
stress on money supply growth, d em and  pull and 
institutional structures (labour, business practices, state 
spending) as primary causes of inflation it does agree 
with the monetarists that renewed growth to bring
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output up (thus equalising dem and)  and reducing cost 
push inflation by spreading costs (higher productivity) 
are unattainable.
1945-70 was clearly a ‘golden age' for industrial capitalist 
econom ies,  and its restoration has immense cross- 
class dom estic  appeal. During this period, the Third 
W orld  also had more rapid growth than before and on 
average more  rapid percentage growth of output than 
industrial economies."' On this interpretation the Old 
International Economic Order was broadly favourable 
to the south, and the wide divergence of growth rates 
relate largely to national action or  inaction and to 
inherent resource inequalit ies quite beyond remedy 
by Brandt type proposals. In its puris t—Kissinger in 
1975 —or revisionist —Richard C ooper  in 1979 —form 
this interpretation leads to a com m itm ent to roll back 
the post-1974 (arguably post-1970) New International 
Econom ic  Disorder by re-establishing the old order  
with minor adjustments, rather than adopt A Programme 
fo r  Su ir¡vat's  s tructural changes.
For governments like the British committed to reducing 
governm ent intervention at hom e and for those who 
believe that reducing government market intervention/ 
management is the key to greater output and efficiency,1' 
extending the type of controls advocated in the Brandt 
R eport  is hardly an attrac tive proposition. T h e  Brandt 
R eport  is frankly interventionist. While no advocate  
of physical allocation by directive, its philosophy is 
clearly one  of m anaged m arkets  with a substantia l 
n u m b er  of s tructural and discretionary controls. For 
example, it wishes to see business practices and anti­
carte l  frameworks of the type em bodied in most 
capitalist industrial economies extended to cover inter­
national business relations, and believes indicative 
forward planning backed  by finance can assure more 
s table  (and larger) supplies of key com m odities,  
alleviating both physical bottlenecks and the costs of 
rapid price swings. T h e  alternative position is that 
existing national m arket m anagem ent works badly 
enough to reduce  actual production, raise costs and 
p rom o te  inflation, and that globalising it a la Brandt 
will have even g rea te r  costs. Business is ra ther  more 
am bivalent about  this—a general dislike for state 
intervention and m anagem ent is usually com bined 
with a n um ber  of more sharply focussed dem ands  for 
particular  intervention and m anagem ent.
From the monetarist and anti-interventionist objections 
flows another.  In its simple form, it runs that if too 
m uch money is the root of m uch evil, and too m uch 
governm ent is the root of m ore, then  rising public 
expenditure  is the square root of all evil. In a more 
sophisticated form the argum ent starts from the facts 
tha t the UK is now a middle sized. middle income 
ec o n o m y  with dec l in in g  re la t iv e  —and, recen t ly .
absolute —econom ic capacity, which is undergoing a 
crisis. Therefore, it is necessary tv) sort out the domestic 
crisis before  the UK can reasonably be expected  (9 
pay enhanced  attention to Third  World problems and, 
in any event,  the UK's resources  and role must 
increasingly be limited to and incorpora ted  in the 
EEC.
These  argum ents  clearly carry weight with the present 
government. Structural adjustment to imports can be 
expensive, aid (even in the form of British exports) has 
some balance of payments and budgetary costs. As 
the intention is to cut the public sector draconically, it 
would be surprising to see its external com ponent 
enhanced. Many businessmen, academ ics and trade 
union constituencies recognise this conclusion, even 
if they do  not accept the general policy.
‘Doing W ell by Doing G ood ’?
The Brandt Report views the ethical case for assisting 
in overcoming absolute poverty quite explicitly as 
consistent with mutual interest, both sectorally (eg, 
energy , food, freer trade) and at m acro  level (demand 
and trade reflation to raise capacity utilisation and 
real output).  It does not claim that the argum ents  are 
identical, but it does view them as reinforcing.
This appro ach  has been criticised. It can be seen as 
muddling two basically separa te  —even competitive — 
cases and leading to mistakes on both the ‘poverty 
eradication ' and mutual interest building fronts.1" It is 
not self-evident that the interests of, say, Brazil. Hong 
Kong or  Saudi Arabia have much in com m on with the 
anti-poverty goals of. say, Bangladesh or  Tanzania. 
Strong overlaps may exist in certain ca se s—eg, India, 
Indonesia—but even here what benefits local dominant 
economic interests in Britain and in India and Indonesia 
may or may not benefit the poor people of the two 
developing countries.
Further, it is not clear that aid or  mutual interest 
agreem ents  with some states are ethically sound. The 
objections vary according to the world view of their 
proponents ,  but association with many states, eg, 
Angola. Afghanistan, Vietnam. Mozambique. Nicaragua, 
El Salvador, Chile. Malawi. Kenya, Indonesia and 
South Africa has been challenged on ethical grounds. 
Finally, even if Brandt is correc t,  'doing well by doing 
good' as an appro ach  may arouse such profound 
suspicion as to be co u n terp rodu c tive .1'1 This particular 
strand of dissent from Program m e fo r  S u n ’ival is 
critical because it splits and neutralises many of the 
intellectuals, middle class professionals and voluntary 
organisations w h o — in Brita in—have been the most 
vocal proponents  of aid and of international econom ic 
reform or restructuring.
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‘Farewell, a long Farewell to all iny Greatness . .
T h ere  is firuiily a quite different type of opposition to 
Brandt, rarely stated but rooted deep in the economic, 
intellectual and bureaucra tic  establishment. This is a 
profound pessimism as to Britain's ability to respond 
creatively— or even to  cope satisfactorily —with rapid 
change. Clearly, to the extent that this perception 
— true or  false—governs action, the UK will seek to 
postpone, slow down and limit change without actually 
causing head-on confrontation. This was precisely 
broad UK strategy on international economic relations 
over 1974-80 (excluding EEC entry, which was more 
or less irreversibly decided before then).
This opposition to Brandt is not only influential but 
logical if its premise that the UK has entered inevitable 
decline and declines more rapidly under conditions of 
rapid change is correct.  This view is not, of course, 
held by the present government, nor was it by Mr 
Heath when he was Prime Minister, but it remains the 
dom inant establishment and perhaps the dom inant 
enterprise and union weltanschaung. As such it is 
influential and —by inertia if nothing else—as opposed 
to the ‘mutual interest in structural ch ange’ argum ent 
of Program m e fo r  S u i t  ¡val a s  it was to the much more 
radical ‘recognition of changed realities and international 
equity' a rgum ent for the original Third  World NIEO 
proposals of 1974-75.
Clearly no group can hold all these objections to 
Program m e fo r  Survival at once. Many opponents  
support only a few. T he  widest appeal probably lies in 
the uncertainty and inherent danger of argum ents  for 
change —each of the o thers  taken separately probably 
has minority support individually, politically or  in 
terms of econom ic groupings.
However, because the different objections have different 
constituencies the sum total is a majority of decision 
tak e rs—and probably of the general public —who are 
at best agnostic and mildly opposed, and in a few cases 
deeply opposed to Programme fo r  Suit ival. It is doubtful 
that this is a strong consensus, or that a strong pro- 
Brandt coalition (even if a minority) could not reverse 
it. But there  is no strong pro-Brandt coalition: its 
natural supporters tend to criticise it as too unrigorous, 
too much of a compromise, mixing ethics and economics. 
In the absence  of a cogent  s ta tem ent of detailed 
examples, the potential econom ic  au d ience  for the 
‘overlapping interest'  a rgum ent remains unconvinced. 
Under such conditions a host of divergent objections 
to the Report,  cogently argued, can destroy its impact.
Counters to O bjections to the Report
>. It is not the primary purpose of this essay to m ake the 
case for P rogram m e f o r  S u i t  ¡val. nor to suggest what
coalition in support of it might have a substantial 
impact on British policy. However, if o u r  reasoned 
summary of the objections is not to becom e a de fac to  
case for the prosecution, a note of the co un te r  queries 
to which those objections are  open is required.
Uncertainty is a factor surrounding all major decisions.
If it were to be accepted  as a reason for rejection, few 
policy changes would ever be adopted : certainly not 
the 1978-80 policies of the present governm ent.  EEC 
entry, the decision to fight over Poland in 1939, the 
proposed platform of Labour's National Executive 
Committee,  the new service forms of the Church  of 
England!21 T he  real question is w hether  the probable 
gains outweigh the probable costs and are large enough 
to justify taking a risk. M oreover, not acting — ie 
letting things drift—is equally uncertain, especially in 
a context like the new international econom ic 
disorder.
In respect of the monetarist objection several issues 
are open. It is clearly open to deba te  w hether  the 
record of British econom ic policy over 1979-81 is a 
success. It is even more open to debate  w hether  it is 
actually monetarism.22 However, two additional points 
can be made in the context of the Brandt Report.
First, its main thrust is not toward raising total in ter­
national liquidity but on rechannelling (transferring) it 
to increase output. T ha t  is not necessarily inflationary', 
indeed it can reduce inflationary pressure even within 
a monetarist frame of reference.
Second, the reasons usually adduced  why dom estic 
Keynesianism is unworkable  are that (especially in the 
UK) dem and goes into imports, creating a payments  
crisis, and that institutional rigidities cause inflation 
long before full capacity or  full em ploym ent output.  
T h e  first critique cannot hold globally (there is no 
Earth payments deficit with Mars!) and the second 
very well may not.  Global Keynesianism may be 
practicable when the dom estic British version is not 
and it may even be the precondition for British domestic 
Keynesianism to be practicable.
W hethe r  the 1945-70 period was ‘golden' for the Third  
World is open to doubt.  Per capita income rose very 
slowly and absolute ou tpu t  divergences increased, as 
did the total num ber  of persons illiterate, hungry, sick 
and in absolute  poverty. In any event,  reconstructing 
the old o rder  is not a serious proposition .23 T he  post- 
1973 world —whose trends  are  hardly favourable ,  
especially post-1978, to the Third World o r  to the 
UK —is its progeny. Som e co heren t  action to halt the 
rise of d isorder and achieve a new, broadly ag reed  set 
o f ‘rules of the g a m e 'a n d  institutions is clearly needed .
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Anti-interventionism is in many ways a debating point. 
Giving limited liability to com panies is intervention. 
(Adam  Smith opposed  it as inconsistent with the 
conditions necessary for his invisible hand' to operate.) 
Giving governm en t a monopoly on currency issue and 
control over credit is intervention. (Professor von 
Hayek opposes both most vehemently.) Providing 
an o th e r  £ 1XXX) mn to British Ley land is intervention 
(and most uncertain as to results).
No actual capitalist or  mixed econom y can opera te  
w i th o u t  substan tia l  s ta te  in te rvention  in m arke t  
m anagem ent.  T he  question is not a m acro  'whether ' 
but micro ‘when',  ‘where", 'how' and ‘how much'. It is 
logical to suppose that this is true internationally, and 
that the present growing disorder at that level is 
ev idence of need for, at the least, altered forms, 
policies and institutions of intervention.
T h e  public finance implications of Program m e fo r  
S u n iv a l  are not massive. T he  basic reflation/recyc(ing 
co m ponen t  is envisaged as on commercia l  accoun t 
and to the extent that it increased UK exports, production 
and profits and decreased unem ploym ent it would, in 
fact, reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. 
T h e  concessional finance proposals of £8,000 mn 
globally might imply £300-400 mn gross for UK, less 
'c lawback ' through reduced  unem ploym ent costs and 
additional tax revenue on production, wages, profits.2'* 
This is not a negligible sum, neither is it a huge one in 
the context of the UK budget.
If the ‘muddling through" argum ent is taken to m ean a 
need  to  keep  different cases for international change 
separa te ,  and recognise that in practice there are wide 
variations in their  force, com plem entarity  and exact 
na ture ,  it is correc t.  But it is not evident that the 
mutual interest and ethical argum ents  are normally 
contradictory .  For example, increasing Third  World 
food shortages have negative implications for UK 
exports  and for UK dom estic  food prices. They  also 
raise ethical imperatives linked to malnutrition and 
starvation. Are the two lines of argum ent inherently 
co ntrad ic to ry?  Is it impossible (or immoral) to use 
both to construc t  a case s tronger  than either  of its two 
parts?-
T h e  ‘inevitable decline ' opposition to Brandt is of 
course part of a m uch broad er  outlook. Is that outlook 
necessarily co rrec t?  (Of course, so long as it is ac ted 
on it is probably self fulfilling.) Does concen tra t ing  on 
limiting and delaying change rather  than seeking to 
adjust to or  capitalise on it actually reduce or  increase 
the costs of (benefits from) change? Why has the UK 
had greater transitional and adjustment problems than 
o the r  ‘m a tu re  industrial economies',  eg. Netherlands, 
Belgium? Is there  really anything inevitable about the 
causes?
W here and What Now?
Querying the logic or  intellectual force of the ideas 
advanced by those individuals and groups opposing 
Program m e fo r  Survival does not in itself offer any 
answer to the question of what to do instead, in 
modification of or  in addition to the Brandt Report 
proposals. T h ere  is fairly broad agreem ent on some of 
the basic points m ade in the Program m e fo r  Survival: 
they constitu te co m m on ground between the IM F (in 
W orld E conom ic O utlook), Heath, Bird and —to a 
lesser extent —H enderson,21’ and can be summarised 
as follows:
1. the present realities of in ternational economic 
relations are not satisfactory from the point of view 
of ‘British interests';
2 . in the  ab sen ce  of  new initiatives no m ajor  
improvem ent can reasonably be expected  before 
the middle of the 1980s (if then);
3. the s tructural problems of the British economy 
have not been solved —indeed, high interest rates 
and a high pound com bined with low profits have 
exacerba ted  them for manufacturing in particular;
4. the substantial proportion (about 30 per cent) of 
British exports sold to developing countries  implies 
that a significant fall in their growth rates or  import 
capacity could worsen Britain's export and m anu­
facturing sector  problems;
5. projecting present ba lance of payments  trends 
for Third  World econom ies (excluding major oil 
exporters) leads inexorably to the conclusion that 
they will be forced to cut imports and growth unless 
a structural increase in exports to industrial economies 
a n d /o r  alterations to facilitate increased (or even 
sustained) resource transfers (comm ercial  an d /o r  
concessional) can be achieved.
T hese  do  seem to imply a British interest in promoting 
action at the structural level in the international economic 
system an d  in particular, its North-South aspect,27 and 
a need for concer ted  action through a num ber  of 
instruments  in a num ber  of sectors. If that conclusion 
is correct,  inaction or  marginal responses to disorders 
and crises are  likely to prove a very poor  second best.
At the present time the only coherent strategic package 
of proposals which has even potential ‘political saleability' 
at international level is P rogram m e fo r  Suirival. Its 
opp onen ts  have not, to  date, p roduced  a com parab le  
monetaris t  (or other) a lternative strategy to grapple 
with the North-South aspects  of the new international 
econom ic  disorder. This  is intellectually and, more 
important,  practically, not a satisfactory situation.
It is of course not novel —the whole NIEO debate  
from the early 1970s on has been characte rised  by the
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tabling of a series of south strategy/programme package 
proposals and a corresponding series of a ttem pts  at 
‘honest b rokerage’ or  ‘negotiated com prom ise’ also 
take into accoun t technical, practical,  political and 
north interest limitations. On the North side—particularly 
in the UK —the response has been to debate ,  delay, 
raise technical queries and objections and agree to 
marginal action—but neither to accept major structural 
changes nor to make substantia l counter-proposals. 
This is a satisfactory approach  only if present trends 
are acceptable to the UK and are consistent with 
international econom ic  stability. Neither  of these 
conditions appears  to be the case.
What Might be Done?
T he implications for those who support and those who 
oppose the Programme fo r  Survival are rather different. 
For the proponents  there is a need to consider the 
nature of the opposition and its argum ents  as a first 
step in deciding whether to try' and convince significant 
econom ic and political groups that Program m e fo r  
Survival should be ac ted upon, or  to push for a 
tactically modified package,2" or  to redraft,-*' and how 
these things should be done.
T h e  opponents  have a somewhat different obligation, 
namely, to produce an alternative strategy or programme 
for the resolution of the intensifying international 
econom ic d isorder and to make out a coheren t  case 
for their ability to  succeed. One such case might be 
monetarist —none has yet been produced in enough 
detail to qualify as a proposal for the s tructural reform 
of the international economic system.11' Another  might 
be centred  on a massive expansion of TNC  activity in 
the south. A third could be a dem onstration  that, 
contrary to the 1970-81 record and almost all present 
projections, the Old International Econom ic O rder 
remains basically viable and dynamic, so that ‘steady 
as you go' policies are  adequa te  and appropriate.
Program m e fo r  Survival's own survival as a focus for 
debate  is very much in doubt, and if its opponen ts  do 
not offer any alternatives this could be the worst 
outcom e. P roponents  of the Brandt Report should 
examine the na ture  of the opposition to it more 
carefully, and seek to co unter  it or  to modify the 
aspects of the p rogram m e which are objected  to. T he  
opponents,  for their part,  should put forward their 
own preferred courses of action to allow for real 
debate  and choice am ong alternative positive options.
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